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United States Ocean Shipping: The
History, Development, and Decline of the
Conference Antitrust Exemption
F. Conger Fawcett*
David C. Nolan**

Since the beginning of this century, the UnitedStates has attempted to
regulate the shipping industry throughgovernmental oversight. In this article, Messrs.Fawcett andNolan examine the ShipingAct of 1916, and consider whether it has been misinterpretedby recentjudicial interpretations.
The authors conclude that the courts' application of United States antitrust
laws to the activities ofshipping conferences is contraryto congressionalintent and the best interests of the industry andAmerican commerce.

The passage of the Shipping Act of 19161 manifested the intention
of the United States Congress to treat the foreign waterborne commerce of the United States differently from other businesses and trades
subject to the antitrust laws of the United States. For a full half-century after that enactment, it remained a matter of general acceptance
that the antitrust statutes were inapplicable to agreements and activities
of shipping conferences within the purview of the Shipping Act. In the
course of major amendments to the Act in 1961, Congress unequivocably reaffirmed this determination. Almost immediately on the heels
of this reaffirmation, however, there commenced a chain of administrative and judicial "reinterpretations" of the statute, by which its exemption from the antitrust laws has been increasingly eroded. By 1979 this
* Partner, Graham & James, San Francisco; member, California Bar, A.B., 1956, LL.B.,
1962, Harvard University.
** Partner, Graham & James, San Francisco: member, California Bar, A.B., 1962, Stanford
University; J.D., 1965, University of California.
I Ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976)).
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reversal of express congressional intent had reached near-crisis proportions.
The perilous state into which the U.S. regulated shipping industry
has thus been placed has, in the current year, finally begun to receive
the close attention of Congress itself. On July 9 and July 12 of this
year, respectively, bipartisan measures were introduced into both the
United States Senate a and House of Representatives, 3 in greater or
lesser degree calling for major revision of the Shipping Act. High on
the list of priorities for change is a reinstatement of an absolute antitrust exemption.
The new statutory proposals are complex and, with hearings on
them even now in progress, will certainly undergo change before any
enactment. It is not the purpose of this article to evaluate those measures, or how well or ill their proposed solutions actually meet the critical antitrust problem. What we seek to do here is to outline just what
that problem is, and how it came to be.
Because this article may be read by persons not generally familiar
with ocean shipping, it may be helpful to begin with a few basic definitions. Liner shipping can be defined, in general terms, as a transportation service by a regularly scheduled ocean carrier sailing on an
established route. While at times schedules and routes may vary, the
additional attribute of "holding out" to perform transportation for any
party requesting it clearly distinguishes liner carriage from tramp and
private carriage.4 Liner shipping is further distinguished by service
which accepts less-than-shipload commodities of all types. By holding
themselves out to provide service for all shippers, liner carriers in the
United States are considered "common carriers imbued with the public
interest" and therefore subject to governmental oversight.
Liner, or common, carriers operate either as independents or as
members of one or more shipping conferences. A shipping conference
is a voluntary association of ocean carriers operating on a particular
trade route between two or more countries. The purpose of a shipping
conference is the self-regulation of price competition, primarily
through the establishment of uniform freight rates and terms and con2 Ocean Shipping Act of 1979, S. 1460, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Bilateral Liner Shipping
Act of 1979, S. 1462, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Shipping Reform Act of 1979, S. 1463, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
3 Omnibus Maritime Regulatory Reform, Revitalization and Reorganization Act of 1979,
H.R. 4769, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
4 Tramp carriers have irregular routes and schedules, sail only when sufficient cargo is available, and generally carry goods moving in quantities sufficient to fil the cargo holds. Private
carriers exclusively carry the property of the carriers' owners and operators.
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ditions of service between the member shipping lines. Although only
infrequent in the U.S. trades, conferences generally govern specific sailing schedules and often cargo or revenue shares assigned to each mem-

ber line. By operating within an internally regulated conference,
carriers seek mutual restraint from the pursuit of sharp business practices and rate tactics that result in unstable economic consequences.5 In

U.S. trades, conferences are expressly permitted by and regulated
under section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916.6
Conferences are, in terms of membership, either open or closed.
In the open conference system, essentially unique to the U.S. trades,7
any shipowner may become a member if he has the intent and ability to
offer liner service and agrees to abide by the terms of the conference

agreement. Closed conferences differ substantially in that the entry of
a new competitor depends on the concurrence of the existing members. 8 Closed conferences, by limiting the amount of conference ship-

ping service to be provided to a given trade, act as a restraint on supply
with the design and effect of limiting empty cargo space-"overtonnag-

ing"-and thus provide a curb against uneconomic sailings which in
turn can result in overall lower-cost shipping.
The most often discussed attribute of a conference system is its

collective control over rates. Generally, conference members are required by their conference agreements to charge uniform rates established by the vote of the membership. Conferences, however, often
provide for "open rates" on specified commodities, which allow indi-

vidual carriers to negotiate rates with the shippers without consideration of a conference-prescribed rate. Commodities subject to open
rates are most often those subject to strong tramp competition and
those involving circumstances such as new manufacturers, new trade
commodities, or other flux conditions.

In order to protect their operations from economic attack by non5 Non-conference liners are shipping companies offering a liner service on a regular or spot
basis independent of any agreement with competing ocean carriers. Non-conference liners usually
operate at rates discounted by a given percentage from the prevailing conference rates, and characteristically solicit only the higher-paying types of commodities, in order to insure sufficient
financial returns to offset rates below the prevailing conference rates. In "good times," however,
i e., when available cargo exceeds available carrying capacity in the trade, the non-conference line
is apt to be quick to come into parity with the conference liner rates.
6 Ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 733 (1916) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976)).
7 In the United States, entry into a conference is open to any carrier able to satisfy minimal
requirements. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976); 46 C.F.R. § 523 (1978).
8 Closed conferences, which are prohibited in the United States but are the rule in most of the
world, occasionally accept new members. The Far East Freight Conference, which serves the Far
East-Europe trade on a closed basis, has admitted more than seven new members in the last five
years.
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members, and thus to assure their members of a sufficient supply of
cargo to sustain their long-term commitment to the particular trade,
conferences typically employ shipper loyalty mechanisms, such as dual
rate or deferred rebate systems, which tie shippers to the services provided by the conference members. Under the dual rate system, a shipper agrees to give all or some fixed portion of its patronage to the
contracting conference carriers, in return for which the shipper is
granted a percentage discount, commonly fifteen percent, from the
rates applicable to those shippers which do not enter into such an
agreement. A shipper who fails to abide by its exclusive-patronage
agreement with the conference members and utilizes a non-conference
carrier in violation of the conference shipper contract is subject to damages, and often to loss of contract privileges. Under the deferred rebate
system, a shipper who ships exclusively by members of a conference is
given a lump-sum discount following the conclusion of a given period
of time, generally one year. Customarily, payment of the rebate is deferred beyond the specified shipping period involved in its computation, e.g, for an additional three months, and the shipper is only
entitled to the rebate if he has continued his exclusive use of conference
members during this additional period of deferral. 9
EARLY GOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO SHIPPING
CONFERENCES

The economic power at least theoretically reposed in steamship
lines operating in shipping conferences has impelled various governments to analyze thoroughly both the philosophy and the practice of
conference systems. In the early part of this century, two major governmental investigations were undertaken: the United Kingdom's
Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, conducted from 1906 to 1909,1t
and the U.S. House of Representatives' Investigation of Shipping Combinations, conducted from 1912 to 1914.'1 The latter investigation is
commonly known as the "Alexander Committee," named after Representative Joshua M. Alexander, then Chairman of the House Commit9 The use of deferred rebates in U.S. trades has been prohibited since 1916. See Ch. 451,
§ 14, 39 Stat. 733 (1916) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1976)). To our knowledge the only
country to follow the U.S. in the outright prohibition of the deferred rebate system is Japan.
Maritime Transportation Law, Law No. 187 of 1949, art. 28.
10 ROYAL COMMISSION ON SHIPPING RINGS, REPORT, CD. Nos. 4668-70, 4685-86 (1909) [hereinafter cited as RoYA.
11

COMMISSION].
REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND

DOMESTIC TRADE,

4

HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, PROCEEDINGS IN

THE INVESTIGATION OF SHIPPING COMBINATIONS UNDER

ter cited as

540

ALEXANDER REPORT].

H. RES. 587, 63d Cong. (1913) [hereinaf-
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tee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. These investigations, while
analyzing the same problems and factual situations, resulted in completely dissimilar recommendations that have led to the present-day
dissimilarities between the conference systems of the United States and
those of the United Kingdom and the rest of the world.
The United Kingdom's Commission on Shpping Rings
At the conclusion of its investigation, the Royal Commission split
into majority and minority positions. Having heard extensive arguments concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the conference
system, both groups came out strongly in favor of the system's continuation.12 In addition, there was general opposition to detailed legislative
solutions; instead, both groups supported the acceptance of collective
bargaining agreements between shippers and shipowners.13 The majority, however, urged the public filing of conference agreements and
tariffs, and further recommended legislation providing for the limited
vesting of power in a governmental entity authorized to hold inquiries
if there were grounds to believe that the national interest was being
adversely affected by any particular conference system. 14 The minority, in contradistinction, was of the view that alternatives to government interference should be explored before even limited governmental
interference was adopted.15 Specifically, it recommended that, prior to
the enactment of laws affording any such governmental supervision, an
opportunity should be given to the conference lines and their shipper
associations, to establish a system of concustomers, through organized
16
sultation and conciliation.
Consideration of the Royal Commission's reports was interrupted
by the outbreak of war in 1914, and Britain's solution to potential shipping conference problems was delayed until the early 1920's. Upon the
conclusion of World War I and after further investigation, the British
government established a purely advisory body known as the Imperial
Shipping Committee, authorized to inquire into ocean freight transportation when it received complaints from parties whose interests in the
matter under dispute were serious and considerable.' 7 The Committee,
an informal tribunal which relied upon the voluntary appearance and
cooperation of those whose testimony and evidence was relevant to the
12
13
14
15

ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 78 and 114.
d at 85, 114.
Id at 89.
Id at 114.

16 Id
17 D. MARx, JR., INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS 68 (1953).
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inquiry at issue, had no real enforcement powers, but instead depended
upon public exposure and its persuasive abilities to reach collectively

bargained solutions. After two decades of operation, the Imperial
Shipping Committee reported in 1939 that shipping conferences had
managed to resolve amicably most serious disputes, and that the system
of collective bargaining between shippers and carriers was essentially
one of fair dealing all around. 8
The Alexander Committee and the U.S Shiping Act of 1916

The Alexander Committee heard arguments similar to those
presented to the Royal Commission concerning the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the conference system. While the Alexander Committee also found conferences necessary as a means of
restricting competition to a level which would ensure adequate service
and a healthy shipping industry, it did not share the Royal Commission's opposition to legislative and institutional solutions. The Alexander Committee instead concluded that "the disadvantages and abuses
connected with steamship agreements and conferences as now conducted are inherent, and can only be eliminated by effective governmental control."' 9 This recommendation of governmental control was
enacted into law as the cornerstone of the 1916 Shipping Act.
The Alexander Committee's Investigation of Shipping Combinations culminated in an historic four-volume report that has become
known as the "Alexander Report."20 The essentials of the Committee's
findings and recommendations, as contained in the report, provided the
blueprint for the Shipping Act of 1916,21 and thus are critical to an
understanding of the history of today's U.S. shipping laws as they pertain to shipping conferences.
Practically all who testified before the Alexander Committee
maintained that if shippers were to be assured of adequate cargo space
and efficient, frequent, and regular service at reasonable rates, shipping
agreements and conference relations were a necessary fact of international shipping.22 It was repeatedly pointed out that conference agreements were as much a protection to shippers as to shipowners.2 3 The
18
19
20
21

Id at 83.
ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 418.
See note 9 supra.
ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 415-24.
22 See, e.g., 2 HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INVESTIGATION OF SHIPPING CONFERENCES UNDER H. RES. 587, 63d Cong. 355-58, 801-14, 1367-

68 (1913) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
23 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 374-81.
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carriers benefitted because conference rates tended to secure a dependable return on investment, allowing for the construction of new facilities for the trade. Shippers benefited from the insured stability of rates
and the elimination of secret arrangements and under-the-table deals
with competitors. Furthermore, insofar as agreements provided a
means for aiding weaker conference members which could not survive
under unrestricted competition, conferences avoided a "survival of the
fittest" war of competition that would ultimately end in near or total
monopoly. Hence, the Alexander Committee concluded, contrary to
the views espoused by some commentators, that a healthy conference
system was affirmatively conducive to the preservation, not the termination, of competition.2 4
In brief, the principal advantages in the preservation of the conference system and other cooperative understandings between liner companies, as perceived by the Alexander Committee, were as follows:
a) regularity and dependability of service;
b) greater security in capital investment;
c) relative stability and dependability of rates;
d) uniformity of rates to all shippers similarly situated, regardless
of economic strength;
e) preservation of service competition by avoidance of an inevitable
"survival of the fittest" result from unrestricted rate competition;
f) reduction in cost of service by regulating tonnage and sailing;
and
g) development of the overall trade by encouraging a wider range
of ports to be served and commodities to be carried.2
To be sure, some testimony opposing the conference system was
received by the Alexander Committee. A number of objections were
theoretical in nature, opposing as much in principle as on any developed facts, the inherently oligopolistic nature of the system; 26 others,
with more specificity, pinpointed certain abuses, either actual or potential, arising out of the concept.27 The latter concerns included the use
of "fighting ships," a device whereby all conference members jointly
shared the cost of one or more vessels deployed specifically to engage in
head-to-head rate competition with an intruding "outside" line; the departure from the premise of equal treatment for all similarly-situated
users; and what were perceived to be excessive exercises of monopolistic power, to wit, the closed-conference system and the deferred-rebate
24 ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 416.
25 Id at 295-303.
26 See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 953, 957, 1289.

27 Id at 995-99.
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system. In the Shipping Act of 1916 which followed, all of these pinpointed objections were expressly prohibited.
The most commonly-voiced objection to the conference system
lodged during the course of the Alexander Committee investigation
was the perceived secrecy in which the conferences maintained their
agreements and their operations.2 8 Again in response to the criticism,
the Committee recommended, and Congress ultimately enacted as part
of the focal section 15 of the Shipping Act, 29 the creation of a supervisory administrative agency with which all such carrier arrangements
should be filed. The agency, a distant forerunner of the present Federal Maritime Commission, was given the authority to disapprove any
agreement which it found: (1) to be "unjustly discriminatory or unfair
as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers or ports, or between
exports from the United States and their foreign competitors," (2) to
"operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States,"
and/or (3) to be "in violation of this Act." 3 Absent any one of these
findings, the agency was directed to approve "all other agreements.'
file and for carrying out an unapPenalties were provided for failure 3to
2
agreement.
proved or disapproved
Thus as early as 1916, two divergent approaches to conference
shipping, represented on the one hand by the United States and on the
other by the United Kingdom, had begun to take clear form. The British Royal Commission perceived the necessity of permitting closed
conferences with strong shipper loyalty agreements, and was opposed
to injecting governmental power into a complex multinational industry. 33 It recommended only the reservation of an unspecified role for
governmental oversight and investigation in the event shipping conferences reached a point where important national interests were being
threatened. 34 The American approach, reflecting the strong antitrust
attitude of the Sherman Act, followed the model of prior legislation
that created the Interstate Commerce Commission. It was to be U.S.
policy to prohibit closed conferences, to prohibit the most effective
shipper loyalty device, ie., the deferred rebate, and to create a direct
28 ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 417.

29 Ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 733 (1916) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976)). The United
States Shipping Board was created by Ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 729 (1916).
30 Ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 734 (1916).
3' Id
32 Id
33 ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 81-84.

34 Id at 89.
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governmental supervisory role over the operation of conferences."
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the substantial infusion of governmental oversight, the U.S. Congress made plain its rejection of traditional American antitrust principles as applied to the foreign
waterborne commerce of the nation.36 Agreements among carriers had
to be filed and approved, but the agency was directed to approve them
unless adverse consequences were proven to exist.37 Moreover, and

though subject to the Shipping Act's own sanction for failure of filing
and/or approval, such agreements were exempt from the operation of
and any other supplementing antitrust acts which
the Sherman 3Act
8
follow.
might
INTERPRETATION OF THE SHIPPING ACT TO

1958:

CUNARD THROUGH ISBR.ANDTSEN

The first major litigation concerning section 15 of the U.S. Shipping Act reached the Supreme Court in the early 1930's. In United
States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 39 the U.S. Navigation
Company sought injunctive relief against the Cunard Steamship Company and its fellow conference members. It was alleged, interalia, that
the conference, through the use of exclusive patronage (dual rate) contracts with certain shippers, had entered into and engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust
Acts.40 The activities complained of had not been submitted to nor
approved by the Shipping Board, the then-extant predecessor of the
present Federal Maritime Commission. The district court dismissed
the case,4 ' holding that the matters complained of were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shipping Board, thus barring any suit based
upon the antitrust laws.42
Following affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir4 3 the Supreme Court accepted a petition for writ of certiorari. 4
cuit,
The Court, in unanimously affirming the lower courts, declared that
section 15 of the Shipping Act requires that:
35 Ch. 451, §§ 14-15, 39 Stat. 733-34 (1916).
36 Ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 734 (1916). This section specifically excepted lawful agreements
made under this section from antitrust liability.
37 Ch. 451, § 14, 39 Stat. 734 (1916).
38 See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
39 39 F.2d 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), af'd, 50 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1931), a'd,284 U.S. 474 (1932).
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15, 26 (1976).
41 United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 39 F.2d 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
42 Id at 207.
43 50 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1931).
44 284 U.S. 605 (1931).
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. shall be

filed immediately with the board; and that the term "agreement" shall
include understandings, conferences, and other arrangements. Thereupon, the board is authorized to disapprove, cancel or modify any such
agreement, "whether or not previously approved by it," which it finds to
be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, etc., "or
to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States or to be
in violation of this Act." But failure to file such an agreement with the
board will not afford ground for an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton
Act at the suit of private parties, whatever, in that event, may be the rights
of the government, since the maintenance of such a suit, beingpredicated
upon a violation of the anti-trustlaws, depends upon the rightto seek a rem45
edy under those laws, a right which, as we have seen, does not here exist.
Exactly twenty years after Cunard, the Supreme Court was
presented with the reserved issue of whether the United States could do
what a private litigant could not do, namely, enjoin under the antitrust
laws conference agreements that had not been submitted to the Federal
Maritime Board for approval. In Far East Conference v. United
States,4 6 the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, held that the government's plea for injunctive relief fared
no better than a private party's, and that any such action under the
antitrust statutes was barred under the rationale of Cunard.
For the next fifteen years, the lower federal courts, following
Cunard and FarEast, uniformly held that the antitrust statutes were
inapplicable to shipping conferences and their agreements and that the
remedies for unapproved activities within the purview of section 15 of
the Shipping Act of 1916 must be found within the provisions of the
Act itself.47 The first case to be decided by the Supreme Court involving the Federal Maritime Board's specific approval of the use by a conference of exclusive patronage contracts with shippers was Federal
Maritime Board v. Zsbrandtsen Co. 4 8 This culmination of lengthy litigation resulted from an order of the Federal Maritime Board which,
pursuant to section 15, had approved a dual-rate system proposed by
the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference.4 9 Upon petition for
review of the Board's decision brought by the Isbrandtsen Line, an in45 284 U.S. 474, 486 (emphasis added).
46 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 141 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1955); American
Union Transp., Inc. v. River Plate & Brazil Conferences, 126 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), a'd
per curiam, 222 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.
Wash. 1952).
48 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
49 In re Statement of Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference, 4 Dec. Fed. Mar. Bd. 706
(1955).
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dependent carrier in the trade, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the subject system of dual rates was illegal
per se.50 The Supreme Court, in a split decision, affirmed the court of
appeals but ambiguously skirted the lower court'sperse holding. 5 Instead, the Court held that the Maritime Board was without power to
approve the particular dual-rate system involved, under section 14's
prohibition against "discriminating or unfair methods. '5 z The Court
stated:
Since the Board found that the dual-rate contract of the Conference was
"ca necessary competitive measure to offset the effect of non-conference
competition" required "to meet the competition of Isbrandtsen in order to
obtain for its members a greater participation in the cargo moving in this
trade," it follows that the contract was a "resort to other discriminating or
unfair methods" to stifle outside competition in violation of § 14. ....53
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO ZSBR.INDTSEN

The Supreme Court's decision in Isbrandtsenraised serious doubts
as to the legality of any of the exclusive patronage/dual rate contract
systems then being used by over 113 conferences serving U.S. ports. In
response to the serious concerns that were created by the Court's decision, Congress enacted a succession of moratoria expressly authorizing
the continuation of existing dual rate systems while it studied the problem,54 and undertook a new, detailed investigation of the conference
system and its regulation by the Federal Maritime Board. After three
years of hearings and studies, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, under the chairmanship of Congressman Herbert Bonner of North Carolina, produced its report 56 and accompanying
proposed remedial legislation. Slightly less than three months later, the
50 Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 239 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
51 356 U.S. at 495 n.15, 497-98.
52 46 U.S.C. § 813 (1976).
53 356 U.S. at 493 (footnote omitted). In a blistering dissent for himself and two others, 356
U.S. at 500, Justice Frankfurter, viewing the majority's holding on the merits against the procedural backdrop of Cunardand FarEast,accused the majority of making a "mockery" of the admin-

istrative process. Id at 519.
54 Pub. L. No. 85-626, 72 Stat. 574 (1958), as extended by Pub. L. No. 86-542, 74 Stat. 253
(1960) and Pub. L. No. 87-55, 75 Stat. 195 (1961).
55 Prior to the investigation impelled by Isbrandtsen, two major U.S. government reports had
concluded that the conference system, including dual rate/exclusive patronage contracts, was absolutely necessary to insure a stable and efficient steamship industry. See A. SANDERSON, CONTROL OF OCEAN FREIGHT RATES IN FOREIGN TRADE, A WORLD SURvEY (1938); INTERAMERICAN MARITIME CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE DELEGATES (1940).
56 HousE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, PROVIDING FOR THE OPERATION
OF STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES, H.R. REP. No.498, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as

H.R. REP. No. 498].
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Senate Commerce Committee followed with its complementary report,5 7 and its own proposed remedy.
More or less contemporaneously with these two Committee investigations, the Antitrust Subcommittee of Congressman Celler's powerful House Committee on the Judiciary also conducted hearings
concerning steamship line practices.5 8 The Celler Subcommittee, although conducting extensive hearings into perceived abuses by the conference system and perceived failures of government regulatory efforts,
did not lead to the enactment of any legislation. Nevertheless, both the
House Merchant Marine Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee clearly were aware of the Celler Committee's views of the applicability of the antitrust laws to the shipping industry, and, indeed, both
gave express recognition to the Antitrust Subcommittee's "assistance."5 9 It is also clear, however, that the legislative history of the 1961
legislation and congressional will concerning the applicability of the
antitrust laws to the conference system is not to be found in the voluminous-and predictably anti-conference--Celer hearings and report,
but rather in the reports of the two Committees charged with the duty
of overseeing the administration of the Shipping Act.
The Bonner Committee
On February 15, 1961, after three years of extensive hearings
throughout the United States, H.R. 4299, a bill which was aimed primarily at permanently establishing the legality of the conference dual
rate system, which had been placed in doubt by Isbrandsen, was introduced into Congress.60 While the first drafts of H.R. 4299 contained no
specific statement regarding the interplay thought to be proper between
the Shipping Act and the antitrust laws, certain language in some of the
early revisions rather unmistakably pointed in the direction of having
the Shipping Act supplement rather than supplant existing statutes. In
section 2 of an early Committee print of H.R. 4299, section 15 of the
Shipping Act would have been amended by the addition of the following introductory clause:
In addition to the penaltiesprovided by the antitrust laws and any other
57 SENATE COMM. OF COMMERCE, STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES AND DUAL RATE CONTRACTS,

S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., IstSess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 860].
58 Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries: HearingsBefore the Antitrust Subcomm

of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, Ocean Freight Industry, 86th Cong., Ist& 2d Sess. (1959-60).
59 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 10.
60 The history of H.R. 4299 and its successor H.R. 6775 is given in SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE

LAW, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE INDEX].
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laws, whoever violates any provision of this section shall be liable to a

continues, to
penalty of not more than $1,000 for each day such violation
61
be recovered by the United States in a civil action.

In subsequent draft revisions, however, this antitrust language was
omitted. H.R. 4299 was later amended and was reported out of the
Committee as H.R. 6775, containing no reference whatsoever to anti-

trust liability. 2 Throughout the subsequent legislative history of H.R.
6775, H.R. 4299's specific antitrust language never reappeared.
Notwithstanding the Committee's rejection of explicit antitrust
language, H.R. 6775 as passed by the House did contain some provisions which, while not specifically referring to the antitrust laws,
sounded in antitrust philosophy. 3 Moreover, the tenor of the new express legitimization of the dual-rate system was distinctly colored and
narrowed by an antitrust presumption against easy approvability.
The Senate Commerce Committee and CongressionalEnactment
When H.R. 6775 came before the Senate Commerce Committee,

the antitrust philosophy was totally rejected.' 4 For example, in the
House bill a critical clause prohibiting agency approval of dual-rate
contracts which would "be reasonably likely to cause the exclusion of

any other carriers from the trade" was deleted upon the sensible determination that inclusion of this clause would have effectively eviscerated
the entire legislation. 5 In the words of Federal Maritime Board66
Chairman Clarence Morse, "the purpose and intent of a dual-rate system is to drive out non-conference competition" '6 7 by forcing the
61 Id at 78 (emphasis added).
62 See 107 CONG. REC. 10,065 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Celler). The Department of Justice's
antitrust-oriented opposition to the bill did not fare much better. The report stated:
The Department of Justice testimony on the legislation was generally unfavorable. While its
position is consistent with the antitrust policy of the United States, it fails to take into account
the peculiar nature of the particular business involved. The ocean steamship industry is
unique among transportation services in a number of respects.
The hearings of the committee have made it quite clear that our traditional antitrust
concepts cannot be fully applied to this aspect of international commerce. . . .[A]ny attempt
to effect regulation of this commerce in a measure comparable to that applied to our domestic
commerce would be highly detrimental to our essential American-flag merchant marine.
H.R. REP. No. 498, supra note 56, at 12-13.
63 E.g., H.R. 6775, §§ 1, 2, 5. See LEGISLATIVE INDEX, supra note 60, at 99-106, 109-10; 107
CONG. REC. 10,063 (1961).
64 S.REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 23.
65 Id.

66 The Federal Maritime Board was replaced in 1961 by the Federal Maritime Commission.
Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1961, 3 C.F.R. 875 (1959-63 Compilation), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. app., at 784
(1976).
67 S.REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 21.
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outside line either to join the conference or to leave the trade altogether. It is abundantly clear, from this and numerous other actions in
a similar vein, that in the Senate, a balance was being struck in favor of
the interests of conference members.
During the floor debate, Senator Kefauver, leading the Senate antitrust proponents, offered certain amendments that would have reinstated many of the House provisions deleted by the Senate Commerce
Committee.6" Respecting the "exclusion of other carriers" issue, Senator Russell Long of Louisiana expressed the majority view:
Senators must realize that the pattern that is necessary to engage in ocean
commerce does not fit into the pattern of our Antitrust Division, composed of lawyers who would like to regulate a farm cooperative as though
it were the Standard Oil of New Jersey...

Now it is proposed by one of the Kefauver amendments that action
cannot be taken by a conference if the total effect would be reasonably
likely to cause the exclusion of any other carrier from the trade.
Yet the whole idea of the bill is to let those people get together on
rates and compete with the people who are not in the agreement. If one
fellow will not join and will not participate, the others are by necessity in
price competition with him. He is trying to put the other fellows out of
business. 69What is wrong with the other fellows trying to put him out of
business?

A similar and parallel action taken by the Senate Committee and
ultimately passed by the full Senate reversed the presumption of the
House-passed bill which would have placed the burden of establishing
affirmative need for an exclusive patronage system on its proponents as
a prerequisite to agency approval. 70 In the Senate, this "public interest" verbiage simply was tagged onto the pre-existing standards for disapproval after notice and hearing.7' The Senate Report, discussing the
change, noted:
In addition to eight specific safeguards which must be in each dual-rate
contract, the bill as it passed the House would require the Commission to
find that the contract was (1) not intended to or reasonably likely to cause
the exclusion of any other carrier from the trade, (2) not detrimental to
68 LEGISLATIVE INDEX, supra note 60, at 3.

69 Id at 420-21.
70 H.R. REP. No. 498, supra note 56, at 18; S. REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 23.
71 Thus, section 15 was amended to read, in pertinent part:
[The Commission] shall, after notice and hearing, disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement. . . that it finds to be discriminatory or unfair.

. . , or to operate to the detriment of

the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this Act, and shall approve all other agreements. ...
The phrase was given similar treatment in the new section 14b. LEGISLATIVE INDEX, supra note
60, at 188, 190.
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the commerce of the United States, and (3) not contrary to the public
interest.,
Your committee concluded that in order for the Commission to make
these additional findings, the parties applying for permission to use dualrate contracts would have to build extensive records before the Commission, even though there might be no opposition to the contracts, and even
though they might clearly contain the eight matters expressly required by
statute.
We believe that any contract which contains the eight safeguards expressly required by the amended bill makes out a prima facie case that the
contract is not detrimental to our commerce, or contrary to our public
interest, or unjustly discriminatory or unfair.7 2

Following the Senate vote on H.R. 6775, the two Houses met in
Conference Committee, and adopted the Senate version essentially verbatim.7 3
Thus, as of October 3, 1961, when H.R. 6775 was enacted as Public
Law 87-346, it was unistakably clear that Congress had squarely reaffirmed the Alexander Committee's determination that it was, and is, in
this nation's affirmative best interests to remove the steamship conference system from the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws and to continue to
place regulation and oversight of the industry with a regulatory body.
Equally clear was the fact that Congress intended any conference-shipper dual rate system to be approved "unless", after hearing, it was
found to be "detrimental to the commerce of the United States, contrary to the public interest, or unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers, exporters, importers, or ports. ' 74 In other words, the
presumption was to be in favor of dual-rate agreements, with the burden upon opponents to prove that they should not be approved.
While it is plain from the legislative history of the 1961 amendments to the Shipping Act that the antitrust advocates had lost the battle, events subsequent to 1961 have clouded that certainty to the point
where a contemporary observer might well believe that just the opposite had happened. The remaining sections of this article will trace the
administrative and judicial actions and decisions by which an unparalleled reversal of a clearly expressed Congressional intent has come to
pass.
72 S.REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 23. The report also includes a letter from then Deputy
Attorney General, now Supreme Court Justice, Byron White recognizing and, from his antitrust
position, critically commenting on this major change. Id at 30, 33-34.
73 LEGISLATIVE INDEX, supra note 60, at 440-46.
74 46 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976); LEGISLATIVE INDEX, supra note 60, at 210.
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THE EROSION OF THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM: JUDICIAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION SINCE

1961

The Loss of the Antitrust Exemption
As discussed above, following the Supreme Court's decisions in
Cunard and FarEast Conference the law appeared settled that the antitrust statutes were inapplicable to agreements of shipping conferences
within the purview of the Shipping Act, whether approved or not, and
that the remedies for violating section 15 of the Shipping Act were to be
found within the provisions of that Act itself." In an exhaustive opinion issued in 1964 on a shipper's antitrust treble-damage claim against
two conferences, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit solidly reaffirmed this legal certainty.7 6 These bedrock legal assumptions,
however, were suddenly shattered when the Supreme Court, taking review of the case, issued its decision in Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,7 7 flatly reversing the Ninth Circuit decision.

Carnation arose in a suit filed by a shipper of dairy products,
which alleged that it had been damaged by virtue of an unlawful combination by two steamship conferences to fix rates for products shipped
to the Philippine Islands. Although both conferences had express Federal Maritime Commission approval for fixing rates by their respective
member lines in their respective trades, and although they had additionally fied for and received approval of an interconference agreement providing for the joint setting of rates by both conferences,
Carnation alleged that the conferences had met and set rates in a manner not covered by their approved agreements. Thus, Carnation alleged that as a result of additional "secret" rate-fixing procedures of the
two shipping groups, its rate requests had been refused improperly.
Acting upon a motion for dismissal filed by the defendant conferences, and also supported by the Federal Maritime Commission, the
federal district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was
without jurisdiction to entertain the suit, because the Shipping Act provided the exclusive remedy for the wrongs alleged.78 On an appeal
75 The Act makes it a violation of section 14b, which expressly authorizes the use of exclusive
patronage contracts, and of section 15 to carry out any such agreement or contract system without
the prior approval of the Federal Maritime Commission, or after such approval has been withdrawn. The Act then provides for civil penalties of "not more than" $1000 per day for each day of
violation. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976). See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
76 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 336 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383
U.S. 213 (1966).
77 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
78 336 F.2d at 653.
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brought by Carnation, the Ninth Circuit, in a seventeen-page opinion
affirming the lower court, stated, inter alia:
In dismissing the action, the court below relied on the decision in the
cases of U.S. Navigation Co. v. CunardSteamshpCo., 234 U.S. 474, and
FarEast Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570. It seems plain to us

that both of these decisions support and require the action of the court
below.
We think that appellants' efforts to assert the lack of the continuing
authority of Cunard
and Far East is entirely fallacious and altogether
79
unsupportable.

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, however, Carnation found a
more sympathetic forum.8" The opinion by Chief Justice Warren overturned fifty years of legal precedent. In reversing the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court majority stated:
The Shipping Act contains an explicit provision exempting activities
which are lawful under § 15 of the Act from the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. This express provision covers approved agreements, which are lawful under § 15, but does not apply to the implementation of unapproved
agreements, which is specifically prohibited by § 15.
Respondents contend, nevertheless, that the § 15 exemption does not
reflect the true intent of the Congress which enacted it. They insist that
the structure of the Act and its legislative history demonstrate an unstated
legislative purpose to free the shipping industry from the antitrust laws.
We do not believe that the remaining provisions of the Shipping Act
can reasonably be construed as an implied repeal of all antitrust regulation of the shipping industry's rate-making activities. 8 1
The majority opinion went on to state that, in the absence of specific
statutory language granting total antitrust immunity, the Court would
not assume that such immunity was intended by Congress.8 The same
Court's own prior case law was given short shrift:
This Court's decisions in United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S.
Co. ... and FarEast Conference v. United States... do not conflict

with our interpretations of the Shipping Act. Those cases merely hold
that courts must refrain from imposing antitrust sanctions for activities of
debatable legality under the Shipping Act in order to8 3avoid the possibility
of conflict between the courts and the Commission.
79 Id at 653, 657.

80 The Federal Maritime Commission, which had defended its jurisdiction and the conferences' position in the lower courts, changed sides before the Supreme Court and "confessed error"
through the Solicitor General.
81 383 U.S. 213, 217.
82 Id at 219-20 (citations omitted).
83 Id at 220. The Court in Carnationmade no mention of its prior statement, made first in
Cunard,284 U S.at 486, and repeated in FarEast,342 U.S. at 574, that "the maintenance of such
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Carnation,by judicial fiat, thus stripped away the antitrust immunity that Congress had plainly intended to apply to regulated shipping
companies, and ignored the rule that reparations provisions in regulatory statutes prevent treble-damage actions based on conduct subject to
such reparations. 4 Thus the Carnation decision placed antitrust penalty exposure on top of Shipping Act penalty exposure, as well as subjecting the regulated ocean shipping industry to potential trebledamage liability under antitrust statutes and reparations liability under
the Shipping Act.85
Following quickly on the heels of Carnation, a whole spate of
treble-damage actions predictably were filed in various courts throughout the nation. Plaintiffs alleged that particular steamship lines had
caused injury through the carrying out of unapproved section 15 agreements. 6 One of these cases, Sabre Shipping Corporation v. American
PresidentLines,8 7 broadly expanded on Carnation and demonstrated
with unmistakable clarity the extreme exposure to which, at least in the
mind of one court, steamship conferences were now to be subjected.
In Sabre, a Federal Maritime Commission Hearing Examiner had
determined that the concerned conferences' rates had been progressively lowered to meet the lower rates of the Sabre Line, a non-conference new entry into the trade. By reason of this "predatory" effect on
Sabre, the rates were held to be "so unreasonably low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States,' 88 within the meaning of
a suit. . . depends upon a remedy under those [antitrust] laws, a right which, as we have seen,
does not here exist."
84 See, e.g., S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 969 (1952).
85 In addition to the civil penalty provision contained in section 15 of the Shipping Act, note
75, supra, section 22 of the Act authorizes private suits for damages for "any violation of' the Act.
46 U.S.C. § 821 (1976). It should be noted that under the Interstate Commerce Act rail and motor
carriers are not subject to regulatory penalties or recoveries for failure to file for and/or receive
I.C.C. approval of their tariff bureau agreements. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, complainants
against air carrier rate-setting must pursue treble-damage actions since that Act does not provide
for reparations.
86 See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), af'dsub nom.'Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,395 U.S. 922 (1969); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied,393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Sapphire S.S. Line v. Atlantic & Gulf Am. Berth Operators, No. 2130-66 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 11, 1974); Transmarine Contract Carriers v. Pacific Coast
European Conf., No. 45938 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 31, 1967); Continental Nut Co. v. Pacific Coast
River Plate Conf., No. 42426 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 7, 1967).
87 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a27'dsub noma.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp.,
407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
88 This conclusion, of course, was quite antipodal to the force and logic of Senator Long's
remarks on the 1961 legislation. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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section 18(b)(5). 89 Sabre then sued for treble damages. 90 The district
court held that, even though the rates of the defendant conferences had

been set pursuant to duly approved section 15 agreements, the finding
of a Shipping Act "violation"'' operated to strip the conferences, retroof the section .15 antitrust immunity for those
actively andpro tanto,
"unlawful" activities.9 2 Hence, it held a treble-damage claim would

properly lie.93
Under Carnationand Sabre, conference lines now find themselves
in a perilous dilemma. On the one hand, conferences are invited and

indeed encouraged to act collectively, in ways which, but for section 15,
would be contrary to the antitrust laws; they are, on the other hand, in

constant danger of retroactive exposure to significant penalties under
those antitrust laws, if (a) under Carnation, a practice, which all had
reason to believe was covered by existing section 15 authority, is at
some later date held to be a "new" section 15 agreement, and thereby

one requiring separate section 15 approval; or if (b) under Sabre, a rate
or other practice, believed to be proper, is held to be violative of any

one or more of the Shipping Act's substantive provisions, subsequent to
a hearing of some years' duration. The problem is exacerbated because, as shown elsewhere in this article, redefinition and reclassifica-

tion by the Commission of what constitutes a "new" and "unapproved"
section 15 agreement is a prevalent, on-going, and quite unpredictable

Commission habit. 4 In addition, the Sabre theory of "retroactive disapproval" is also still very much alive.95
It is difficult indeed to believe that Congress intended the shipping
industry to function in such a hazardous guessing-game atmosphere of
internally-conflicting regulatory commands. To the contrary, in light
89 This section was added to the Shipping Act by the 1961 Amendments. Pub. L. No. 87-346,
75 Stat. 762 (1961) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1976)). It reads in pertinent part: "[Tihe
Commission shall disapprove any rate or charge filed by a common carrier by water in the foreign
commerce of the United States or conference of carriers which, after hearing, it finds to be so
unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States." Id
90 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
91 Actually, section 18(b)(5) is incapable of being "violated". This legal nicety, however, did
not deter the district court.
92 285 F. Supp. at 956.
93 Id at 957.
94 See note 132 and accompanying text infra.
95 The initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge Seymour Glanzer, FMC Docket No. 7235 (filed August 15, 1977), is currently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from the Commission's reversal, 19 SHIP. REG. REP. (P&F) 19 (Mar. 9, 1979), on
the asserted ground that the Commission was "irrational" in overturning its law judge's holding
on this point. National Ass'n of Recycling Industries, Inc. v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, No. 79-1267
(D.C. Cir., appeal docketed Mar. 12, 1979).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

1:537(1979)

of the conscious elimination in the early stages of the 1961 legislation of
a clause which would have added language expressly subjecting the industry to antitrust as well as Shipping Act penalties,96 it seems clear
that Congress had just the opposite intent.
The Loss of the Presumption ofApprovability
Congress, in enacting the 1961 amendments, rejected the theory
that proponents of dual rate contract systems should bear the burden of
affirmatively proving their need. Instead, as proposed by the Senate
Committee, Congress put the presumption squarely in favor of approvability of such systems-just as already existed for Section 15
agreements. Approval was to be given unless, after notice and hearing,
adverse factual findings, warranting disapproval, could be mustered. 97
The antitrust forces, having lost the battle in the 1961 legislation,
had not, however, given up the crusade. The first and stage-setting
scenes were played, as with the earlier Celler hearings, before a congressional committee favorable to the antitrust precepts but lacking any
maritime oversight responsibilities. In this instance the forum was the
Joint House-Senate Economic Committee, then chaired by Senator
Paul Douglas of Illinois.
The Douglas Committee, 1963-1966. In May of 1963, the Joint Economic Committee initiated what was termed an "investigation of the
effects of ocean freight rates on the international balance of payments."9 8 This investigation lasted until 1966 and resulted in two reports,99 both of which contain statements apparently aimed at directing
the Federal Maritime Commission to act in a manner totally in conflict
with congressional intent as expressed in the 1961 amendments.
Picking up where Congressman Celler had left off, the Douglas
Committee, in its 1965 Report, made clear its dissatisfaction with the
majority view of Congress, stating "that only in particular circumstances, and only when strictly supervised by Government, should
' ° This message was
steamship lines be granted antitrust immunity. '""
made abundantly clear in a further passage, several pages later, where
the Report noted:
96 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
97 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
98 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., DISCRIMINATORY OCEAN FREIGHT RATES AND THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS,

S. REP. No. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1].

99 S. REP. No. 1, supra note 98; JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89TH CONG., 2D SESs., DISCRIMINATORY OCEAN FREIGHT RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Comm. Print 1966).
100 S. REP. No. I, supra note 98, at 22.
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The Commission must consciously cease to approve agreements merely
because nothing appears against them: it must determine to give its approval only where affirmative good cause appears in their form. 4pplication of a doctrine of presumptive illegality, conformably with the
underlying policy of the
0 United States, might do much to retardthe spread
of conferencepower.'
In the face of Congress' very recent legislation that was expressly
and diametrically opposed to this position, one may wonder what the
Douglas Committee hoped to accomplish. The answer seems clear
enough. In its hearings and its 1965 Report, the Committee, again following after the Celler Subcommittee, took some pains to castigate the
newly-organized Federal Maritime Commission and its first Chairman
of the
for what the committee perceived to be the lax10 administration
2
Shipping Act, following the 1961 amendments.
The Joint Committee's objective, obviously enough, was to badger
the Commission sufficiently so that the agency itself would become the
instrument of subverting the congressional intent embodied in the very
statute that the agency was established to administer. The Committee
had already shown it had political, if not legislatiqe, clout. At its behest, one Commission Chairman had already been removed. 10 3 In the
vacuum created by the apparent lack of concern of the two maritime
oversight committees, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee, the Commission got the
message.
The Commission's Response. Prior to the 1961 legislation, section
15 had authorized the then-existing Federal Maritime Board to disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement which it found (a) to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair, (b) to operate to the detriment of the
commerce of the United States, or (c) to be in violation of the Act. t"
Unless the Board found one or more of these conditions to exist, it was
directed to approve agreements submitted to it.'0 5 The 1961 amendments added a fourth ground, namely "contrary to the public interest,"10 6 to the existing three. Just what, if anything, this new phrase
7
meant or was meant to add to the existing section 15 standards, 10
101 Id

at 24 (emphasis added).
102 See, -g., S. REP. No. I, supra note 98, at 28 (discussing its successful efforts in having a
replacement chairman designated by the President).
103 Id.
104 See note 30 and 45 and accompanying text supra.
105 See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
106 See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
107 This includes section 14b standards, as well, since the new clause was also included within
that section.
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was-Senator Douglas' Joint Committee's subsequent view notwithstanding-anything but clear.
As described earlier in this article, the words had originally, in an
early House draft, signified the addition of a new though unexplained,
affirmative burden of establishing approvability which proponents of
section 15 agreements and section 14b contract systems would be
obliged to meet. 0 8 This language of affirmative burden, however, had
been substantially softened by the time the bill left the House and was
eliminated entirely in the Senate bill which ultimately became the
law. 1 9 In the minds of most contemporary observers, the clause, in
light of its form and placement in the statute as enacted, really added
nothing of substance. By 1965, however, the Douglas Committee,
reaching back in time, had resurrected the discarded concept of "affirmative burden of justification," and telegraphed that view to the
Federal Maritime Commission.
The first clear indication of the impact of that instruction to impose an affirmative burden and presumption of illegality upon those
seeking section 15 approval came to light in the Federal Maritime
Commission's 1966 decision in the Mfediterranean Pools Investigation."' The M4fediterranean Pools proceeding was instituted on the
Commission's own motion to investigate the initial and continued approval under section 15 of five separate agreements providing for
"pooling.""' The Hearing Examiner in his initial decision followed
Commission precedent and approved all the involved agreements on
the ground that there was no evidence of record that demonstrated that
they were contrary to Shipping Act standards.
The Commission, however, in reviewing the initial decision, abandoned its position, which it consistently had held for fifty years, that
agreements subject to section 15 were to be disapproved only when
they were specifically found to operate in one of the ways set out in
section 15, and expressly reversed the Examiner on that point."' For
the first time, the Commission embraced the "presumptively unlawful"
theory long urged, theretofore unsuccessfully, by the antitrust forces in
108 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
109 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
110 9 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 264 (1966).
111 As explained in the Commission's decision, pooling involves agreement by the conference
members to place their freight revenues into a general fund. From the general fund each member
receives a fixed percentage as set by the agreement. The member lines undertake to maintain
specified minimum sailing requirements, and some agreements specify an amount of traffic allocated to each member with penalties for overcarriage or undercarriage. Id at 266.
112 Id at 294.
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Congress and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The
Commission explained its new position as follows:
We think it now beyond dispute that "the public interest" within the
meaning of Section 15 includes the national policy embodied in the antitrust laws ....
For presumptively, all anticompetitive combinations run
counter to the public interest in free and open competition and it is incumbent upon those who seek exemption of anticompetitive combination
under section 15 to demonstrate that the combination seeks to eliminate
or remedy conditions which preclude or 113
hinder the achievement of the
regulatory purposes of the Shipping Act.
Notwithstanding this announcement of a significant departure
from prior law, the Commission held that the proponents of the agreements in question had, with insignificant exceptions, adequately proved
their case; hence the agreements were approved and no reason developed for raising any court challenge to the new standard. Such a challenge did come, however, more or less contemporaneously, in the series
of appeals culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in FederalMaritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien.1 4
The lengthy Svenska litigation began when the Commission, upon
a complaint by the American Society of Travel Agents, commenced a
general investigation into the practices and previously approved agreements of two passenger steamship conferences whose member lines
provided passenger service across the Atlantic. The proceeding ultimately focused upon two specific provisions of the conferences' agreements: the first, a "tying rule" which prohibited travel agents who
booked passage on the conference member lines from selling passage
on non-member lines, and the second, the so-called "unanimity rule,"
which required unanimous action by the conference members before
the maximum rate on travel agent commissions could be raised. Following extensive hearings and an initial decision, the Commission held
that these two provisions relating to travel agents were contrary to sec15
tion 15 and must be modified or eliminated.'
Upon review by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, the case was remanded to the Commission. The court held that
the Commission had failed to find, as a prerequisite to its order of disapproval, that the agreements had in fact operated in any one of the
four ways which Congress had specified as statutory reasons for war113 Id at 289-90.
114 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
115 Steamship Conferences/Travel Agents Investigation, 7 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 737 (1967).
This decision was not a unanimous one: two commissioners dissented and one dissented in part.
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ranting disapproval under section 15.116 Upon remand the Commission, again by a divided vote, after requesting and receiving briefs and
holding an oral argument but not receiving new testimony or evidence,
issued its second decision holding that the tying and unanimity rules
were presumptively contrary to section 15, and accordingly, in the absence of facts demonstrating that they were required by a serious trans17
portation need, must be disapproved."
Once again judicial review was taken and once again the court of
appeals found that the Commission had utterly failed to make any of
the requisite findings. 1 8 This time, however, the court declined to remand, and simply reversed, in light of the Commission's demonstrated
unwillingness to follow the court's instructions."'
Thus twice rebuffed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Commission, as with the Carnation experience
but two years earlier, sought and found a friendlier ear at the Supreme
Court level. The Supreme Court reinstated the Commission's decision

and approved its application of an antitrust-based "positive benefit"
standard, stating:
The Commission has formulated a rule that conference restraints which
interfere with the policies of antitrust laws will be approved only if the
conferences can "bring forth such facts as would demonstrate that the
. . . rule was required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act." In the present case, but for the partial
immunity granted by the Act, both the tying and unanimity rules undoubtedly would be held illegal under the antitrust laws, and respondents
failed to satisfy the Commission that the rules were necessary to further
some legitimate interest. The Commission found this sufficient reason to
disapprove the rules, but the Court of Appeals disagreed ...
Insofar as this holding rests on the absence of an explicit antitrust test
among the "four ways set out in the section," we think the Court of Appeals was excessively formalistic in its approach to the Commission's
findings. By its very nature an illegal restraint of trade is in some ways
"contrary to the public interest," and the Commission's antitrust standard, involving an assessment of the necessity for this restraint in terms of
legitimate commercial objectives, simply gives understandable content to
the broad statutory concept of "the public interest."
.. . The Commission's approach does not make the promise of anti116 Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 351 F.2d 756 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
117 Investigation of Passenger S.S. Confs., Regarding Travel Agents, 10 Dec. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n 27 (1966).
118 Aktiebolaget Svenska America Linien v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 372 F.2d 932 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
119 372 F.2d at 934.
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trust immunity meaningless because a restraint that would violate the antitrust laws will still be approved whenever a sufficient justification for it
exists. Nor does the Commission's test, by requiring the conference to
come forward with a justification for the restraint, improperly shift the
burden of proof. The Commission must of course adduce substantial evidence to support a finding under one of the four standards of § 15, but
once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is "contrary to the public
interest," unless other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the
weight of this factor. It is not unreasonable to require that a conference
adopting a particular rule to govern its own affairs, for reasons best
known to the conference itself, must come forward and explain to the
Commission what those reasons are. We therefore hold that the antitrust
test formulated by the Commission 2is0 an appropriate refinement of the
statutory "public interest" standard.'
Svenska was certainly a sharp departure from pre-existing law and
from what Congress had seemed quite clearly to be saying and doing in
the "Bonner Act" amendments of 1961. But just how far the decision
meant to go is at least ambiguous. In a sense it may be read merely as
approving the Commission's requirement that the proponents of a section 15 agreement, or at any rate an agreement with antitrust implications,' 2 ' "come forward and explain . . . what [the] reasons are"' 122 for
seeking such approval or, as in Svenska itself, continued approval.
Moreover, on careful reading, it seems quite clear that the Supreme
Court was not mandating the "antitrust standard" and the resultant
Comreversed burden of proof; rather, Svenska simply held that the
23
mission was "not unreasonable" in adopting such a standard.1
Whatever the Supreme Court intended, the aftermath of Svenska
leaves no doubt that the congressional mandate respecting the approvability of section 15 agreements has been utterly turned upside
down. What started in Svenska as the Supreme Court's blessing of an
agency-created informal rule of procedure now has been converted into
a Supreme Court commandment of fundamental statutory imperative.
120 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 243-46
(1968) (citations omitted).
121 A great many agreements which are now required by the Commission to be filed separately
for section 15 approval have no antitrust overtones at all. Moreover-and the authors have not
seen this raised in subsequent cases or comments-Svenska involved the passenger cruise business, an industry quite commercially distinct from the liner cargo business.
122 390 U.S. at 246.
123 Interestingly, subsequent to Svenska the Supreme Court has held that regulatory agencies
are not to interpret the "public interest" standard in their enabling statutes as including the "public interest" evidenced in the enactment of a different statute. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n,
425 U.S. 662 (1976). This holding makes the Federal Maritime Commission's current legal concept of "antitrust administration" even more dubious.
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While there were early indications of this development in the first
few years following Svenska,'24 its culmination was reached in a 1976
Commission decision, Canadian-American Working Arrangement/Canadian-AmericanDiscussionAgreement,125 generally known as
the "CAWA-CADA" decision. In CAWA-CADA, several conferences
had filed for continued Commission approval of limited-term agreements dealing with the stabilization of so-called "cross-border" Canadian-United States traffic. After the Commission, having received a
variety of protests, set the matter for formal hearing, the conferences
realized that the decisional process would not be completed before the
Commission's earlier limited-term approval expired. The conferences
therefore fied a petition, supported by a memorandum of justification,
requesting interim continued approval, pendente lite, the outcome of
the formal hearing. The Commission determined that the conferences
had failed to demonstrate any "emergency conditions necessitating the
approval of these agreements during the pendency of the investigation
and hearing instituted,"' 2 6 and thus allowed the agreements to lapse.
In the course of denying the conferences' request for interim approval, the Commission stated its perception of statutory verity as follows:
Approvals, disapprovals, and modifications of agreements submitted to
the Commission are effected by an order of the Commission. Orders of
the Commission must be supported by substantial evidence. The impact
of the holding in the Svenska case is to require the Commission to disapprove a price-fixing agreement unless there is before the Commission substantial evidence to support a finding by the Commission that the
agreement is justified. This is so, because the Commission is required to
disapprove an agreement it finds to be contrary to the public interest, and,
when presented with a price-fixing agreement, the Commission has before
it, in the agreement itself, substantial evidence that the agreement is contrary to the public interest. The Commission is, therefore, required to so
find, unless it has other evidence before it demonstrating a need for the
agreement, which need outweighs the anti-competitive effect of that
agreement. Thus the burden of going forward with the evidence, that is,
the burden of adducing evidence which shows the need for the agreement,
is on the proponents of the agreement.
There are several elements essential to any approval of a price-fixing
agreement. It is not enough that there exists some transportation need or
some public benefit, there must exist a serious transporation need or an
importantpublic benefit. Further, in addition to the existence of a serious
124 See, e.g., Agreements Nos. DC-38 & DC 38-1, 17 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 251 (1974);
Agreement No. 9932, 16 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 293 (1972); United Stevedoring Co. v. Boston
Shipping Ass'n, 16 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 7 (1972).
125 FMC Docket No. 75-76, 16 SHiP. REG. RaP. (P&F) 733 (Feb. 26, 1976).
126 Id. at 750.
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transportation need or an important public benefit, the agreement proffered for Commission approval must be necessitatedby that serious trans1 7
portation need or necessary to secure that important public benefit.'
The difficulty of the steamship industry's compliance with this new
dictate and the corresponding wisdom of Congress in having refused to
require it are apparent from the ostensibly explanatory second paragraph, quoted above. It may be going too far to say that the "explanation" is meaningless; it certainly is no exaggeration, however, to say
that it affords little insight or meaningful assistance to the industry.
Cast in terms such as these, the "antitrust presumption" is nearly impossible to overcome.
C4WA-C4DA4, of course, arose in a rather highly particularized
factual setting as, indeed, did Svenska. Nevertheless, it today serves as
the across-the-board standard, however impenetrable, for all section 15
128
filings.
The "antitrust presumption of unapprovability" has one further
fall-out effect. It has become the automatic talisman for those who
would impede or destroy a functioning conference system, an open invitation to protracted, expensive, and aimless hearings, or threats of
such hearings, that ultimately result in the talking to death and
smothering of worthwhile conference advancements and innovations.
Noteworthily, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has
discovered in this economic fact of life its most effective tool for the
subversion of its ancient arch-foe, section 15 of the Shipping Act. Indeed, today the Antitrust Division is one of the most frequent and vocal participants in any Commission proceeding of any significant
29
consequence.1
The combined impact of the Carnation-Sabreconcept of retroactive application of antitrust penalties, coupled with the Mediterranean
Pools-Svenska-CAWA-CADA concept of an antitrust presumption
127 Id at 736-37 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
128 The Commission is currently considering proposed regulations which would make the
adoption of the CAWA-CADA standard official. See FMC Docket No. 76-63; 44 Fed. Reg. 36,077
(1979); 41 Fed. Reg. 51,622 (1976). These proposals may have remained pending for an unusually
long time partly because of the indirect pressure of shipping bills introduced in Congress. See
note 135 and accompanying text infra.
129 Query, however, the propriety of the Department's advocacy program in light of its statutory duty to defend Commission decisions on review. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1976). This
very point of the Department's-actually the Antitrust Divison's--standing to challenge the Commission's decisions is now subjudice United States v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, No. 79-1299 (D.C.
Cir., appeal docketed Mar. 19, 1979). Very recently the Commission, itself, has begun to take
steps against wholesale Antitrust Division intervention in its proceedings. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg.
60,996 (Oct. 23, 1979) (new intervention rules). At the same time, the Commission continues to

apply the "antitrust presumption."
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of what is in "the public interest," have rendered Congress' promise of
immunity from the antitrust laws for the conference system, through
section 15, a near-total myth. Conferences literally act at their peril in
conducting the very activities for which they were organized, iLe. "collective action," when the Commission and courts view any such conduct as an "anticompetitive combination" which is presumptively
"contrary to the public interest." Thus carriers operating as members
of approved shipping conferences must be prepared, prospectively and
retrospectively alike, to "prove" that their actions at any given time are
affirmatively "in the public interest." This, a difficult burden to meet at
best, is a virtual impossibility if the regulators assume that "the public
very opposite of the nature and function of the conferinterest" is the
130
ence system.
Heightening and exacerbating the obvious difficulties with this
two-fold loss of section 15's antitrust protections has been the increasing tendency of the Commission and its staff both to broaden by interpretation the types of agreements subject to section 15131 and,
concomitantly, to narrow the interpretation of those activities which
were intended to be approved under the terms of an existing section 15
agreement. This is particularly acute with respect to conference agreements. Increasingly, conferences are subject to "second-guessing," that
is, retroactive determinations by the Commission that some practice or
other formerly regarded as routine is suddenly a new section 15 agreement, and therefore outside the scope of the literal wording of the conference basic document. 13 2 The examples on an informal staff level are,
of course, far, far greater both in number and variety. As a natural
result, and because the risk of such retroactive second-guessing is so
great, many conferences have been filing an increasing number of
130 The extremes to which conference lines are exposed in this guessing game is underscored by
the recent nolo contendre pleas entered following grand jury indictments accusing certain lines in
the North Atlantic trades of straying from their "approved" agreements and not keeping accurate
minutes. See J. CoM., June 8, 1979, at 1 (report on United States v. Atlantic Container Lines,
Crim. No. 79-00271, (D.C.D.C., filed 1979)).
131 Examples include: transshipping agreements, agreements rationalizing inland transportation performed in foreign countries, contracts with self-policing bodies, agreements between foreign principals to enter the United States trades, container interchange agreements, collective
bargaining agreements, and agreements to use dockside located equipment.
132 See, e.g., Cancellation of Consolidated Allowance Rule 20 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 858
(1978) (tariff rules granting consolidation allowances held non-cancellable); Disposition of
Container Marine Lines, 11 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 476 (1968) (intermodal rates); Persian Gulf
Outward Freight Conference, 10 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 61 (1966) (two-tier rates); North-Atlantic-Mediterranean Frt. Conf. and United Arab Co., 9 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 431 (1966) (socalled "requirements contracts"); PCEC - Port Equalization Rule, 7 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 623
(1963) (port equalization).
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amendments to their basic conference agreements, seeking Commission
sanction to engage in activities heretofore thought either fully author133
ized by section 15, or conversely, not even remotely subject to it.
The history of less than two decades of administrative and judicial
interpretation has led to a double-barreled subversion of clearly-ex-

pressed congressional intent of unprecedented proportions. The deletion of language that would have expressly made antitrust sanctions
applicable to section 15 violations, in addition to the civil penalties already contained in that section, points to a result exactly opposite to

that reached by the courts in Carnation and Sabre. In addition, the
fully conscious removal of the affirmative-showing requirement of the
"public interest" clause of section 15 also clearly contradicts the "antitrust presumption" represented by the MediterraneanPools-SvenskaCAW-CADA trilogy.
The Failureof the Dual-Rate System
As both House and Senate Reports recognized in formulating the
1961 amendments, and as the Alexander Committee had squarely recognized nearly fifty years earlier, the only means to a successful confer-

ence system is the assurance of an effective shipper tying device.
Congress, striving for a balanced approach, felt it had created such a
"fair and effective" loyalty device in section 14b of the 1961 amendments.' 34 The results, however, have not borne out the promise, and, in

supreme irony, the most focused point of the 1961 legislation has failed.
Although a discussion of the reasons for this failure are largely
beyond the scope of this article, the fact of the failure is sufficiently
widespread and notorious that in the two most recent sessions of Congress, respected congressional leaders, knowledgeable in maritime mat-

ters, have begun to suggest seriously its replacement with a forthrightly
legalized deferred rebate system. 13- Beyond the several major substan133 Examples include conference office housekeeping rules, steamship agency contracts, "agreements" to discuss possible further trade-stabilizing mechanisms, and agreements to place a gate on
a pier facility. On a particular day in May of 1977 the Commission's "Sunshine Meeting" agenda
included section 15 filings for (a) a "husbanding agreement" between two steamship lines; (b) a
"discussion agreement" between two terminal associations and (c) a "technological assistance
agreement" between a port city and a terminal operator. 42 Fed. Reg. 23,223 (1977).

134 S. REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 1.
135 See, eg., H.R. 11,422, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H1909 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1978)
(to authorize the formation and implementation of closed conferences in U.S. foreign commerce);
H.R. 9518, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H10,877 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977) (to amend the
Shipping Act to provide for a three-year period to reach a permanent solution of rebate practices).
The bills, both introduced, with bipartisan support, by Rep. John Murphy, Chairman of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, failed to survive the 95th Congress. In the
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tive deficiencies in the contract system as currently administered, if not
perhaps, as actually enacted in section 14b, the antitrust-based "reversal of presumptions" has taken its toll here, just as with section 15.
Congress's intention, in 1961, was clear. The Senate Committee report
explained:
[A]ny contract which contains the eight safeguards expressly required by
the bill makes out a prima facie case that the contract is not detrimental to
our commerce, or contrary to our public interest, or unjustly discriminatory or unfair. 136

Notwithstanding this seemingly unequivocal statement of congressional will, in less than two decades the Commission and the appellate
courts have succeeded in turning it completely inside out, and, as with
section 15, Svenska now rules supreme.
Latin American/PacficCoast Steamship ConferenceI" was the first
major decision involving the extension of the antitrust concept of "public interest" and the resultant reversal of the congressionally-intended
presumption of approvability to a section 14b situation. Although the
proceedings had commenced some ten years earlier, the final agency
decision was decided purely on Svenska and the Svenska-born test of
"unwarranted invasion of the antitrust laws."' 138 On appeal, the circuit
court whose knuckles had been so severely rapped by the Supreme
Court in Svenska refused to see any distinction between section 14b
and section 15. The139court affirmed the Commission, solidly on the precedent of Svenska.
A 1977 order handed down by the Commission, conditionally disapproving an application of the North Atlantic Israel Eastbound
Freight Conference for permission to institute a dual-rate contract system, is a good example of the extent to which the whole "antitrust presumption" concept now controls both this area of section 14b contracts
and section 15.14' The conference was comprised of two steamship
lines, American Export Lines and Zim Israel Navigation Company,
each providing regular service to Israel. No non-conference service exfirst session of the 96th Congress, bills providing for the substantial overhaul of the current administration of the Shipping Act have been introduced in both Houses. See notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text supra. Although legalization of the deferred-rate system has been eschewed in all
such measures, the concept continues to emerge as a distinctly "thinkable thought."
136 S. REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 23. See also note 72 and accompanying text supra.
137 Agreement No. 8660-Latin America/Pacific Coast S.S. Conf., 12 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n
149 (1969), on rehearing, 14 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 172 (1970).
138 12 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n at 153.
139 Latin American/Pacific Coast S.S. Conf. v Federal Mar. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972).
140 - Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n -, reprintedin FAZ C DisapprovesN. /1 Israel Eastbound
Freight Conference Exclusive PatronageApplication, CONG. INFO. BUREAU, May 6, 1977, at 20.
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isted in the trade, nor had it for a number of years; however, one other
steamship operator, the Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority
(PRMSA), notified the Commission by letter that it was thinking about
instituting such a service. With extraordinary concern for this wholly
conjectural "independent competitor," the Commission based its disapproval upon the following reasoning:
If the Conference implements an exclusive patronage contract system in
the U.S. North Atlantic to Israel trade, a trade in which it has a virtual
monopoly, it could effectively preclude PRMSA from independent[ly]
competing in that trade. This is so because the level of service which
PRMSA could possibly offer in that trade with one vessel could not serve
the needs of shippers sufficiently to entice those shippers to ship a portion
of their cargo aboard PRMSA's vessels a portion of the time, even at rates
30 percent below the noncontract rates of the Conference, because the
remainder of the time those shippers would have to pay the non-contract
rates of the conference, which would be 15 percent higher than the rates
which the competitors of those shippers would enjoy by reason of signing
the exlusive patronage contract of the Conference.
The facts alleged would not constitute the kind of severely adverse
disruption in service to Israeli ports necessary to justify the anticompeti[tive] effects of an exclusive patronage contract system in that trade.
Consequently .

.

.the Agreement is contrary to the public interest.

41
As such, it must be disapproved.'
In light of Congress' frank recognition when it expressly authorized the contract system that its very purpose was precisely to allow
conferences to eliminate nonconference competition, 142 the Commission's solicitude for a non-existent competitor seems remarkable indeed. Equally remarkable, in light of the Senate Committee's
language,143 is the totality of the shift of presumption and burden of
proof.

CONCLUSION

In 1961, Congress legislatively reversed an erroneous judicial interpretation in the Isbrandtsen case that had caused the "sudden disruption of international shipping's primary way of doing business."'144
Today, largely, although unintentionally, as a result of that 1961 legislative action, international shipping to and from the United States is at
an even more perilous crossroads. It is again imperative that Congress
act, not only to correct the judicial-administrative interpretations which
141 Id. at _, CONG. INFO. BUREAU, May 6, 1977, at 22.
142 See text accompanying notes 63 and 66 supra.
143 See.note 136 and accompanying text supra.

144 S.REP. No. 860, supra note 57, at 9.
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have so thoroughly distorted the congressional intent clearly expressed
in 1961, but to prescribe a shipping policy for the 1980's and beyond.
Within the past several years, Congress has considered a number
of measures for amending the Shipping Act to strengthen the conference system, and has passed a few of them. It is only now, however,
beginning to give sufficient attention to what we believe is the central,
all-pervasive source of the system's malaise, namely the subordination
of this internationally recognized system to parochial views of domestic
14 5
antitrust dogma.
In its legislative efforts, Congress should act on the premise that
the "public interest" of the United States in international liner commerce is the policy of the Shipping Act, and not the policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Svenska must be reversed. Consistent with this
step, it seems apparent that Congress must also reaffirm its intent that
violations of the Shipping Act shall carry the penalties and sanctions,
and those only, that are set forth in the Shipping Act itself. Finally, a
tying device that will assure stability and equal treatment of U.S. exporters and importers, as well as the survival of U.S. and friendly foreign liner companies, must be developed and sanctioned. Without
these essential changes, piecemeal legislative reforms are certain of failure.

145 See, e.g., Equal Access and PoolingAgreements in U.S. Liner Trades: Hearingson H.
11,862 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marineof the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

